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Abstract
This is the rst paper to provide a comprehensive theoretical analysis of the third and
fourth order lottery preferences implied by cumulative prospect theory (CPT). We consider the
lottery choices from three alternative reference points: the status quo, the expected payout and
the MaxMin. We report a large number of new results given the standard assumptions about
probability weighting. We demonstrate, for example, the general result that from the status
quo reference point there is no third order reection e¤ect but there is a fourth order reection
e¤ect. When the average payout or the MaxMin is the reference point, we lose generality but
can demonstrate that representative individuals with power value functions can make prudent
or imprudent, temperate or intemperate choices depending on the precise magnitude of lottery
payo¤s. In addition to this, we show that these representative CPT individuals can exhibit some
surprising combinations of second with third and fourth order risk attitudes. Throughout the
paper, we contrast our theoretical predictions with results reported in the literature and we are
able to reconcile some conicting evidence on higher order risk preferences.
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1 Introduction
Over the last three decades theoretical research has demonstrated the important role that higher
order preferences, particularly prudence or temperance, play in economic models of risky choice
such as savings, auctions, asset pricing and several other (see Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2018)
for a review of this literature). Experimental evidence of the puree¤ect of those higher order risk
attitudes was facilitated by the introduction of choice-based denitions of preferences of any order
by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006). This major contribution set out the method for revealing
higher order risk preferences employing experimental methods. They demonstrated how the choices
between particular lottery pairs could be employed to elicit higher order preferences. Subsequently,
a number of experimental studies have employed choices between lotteries to reveal the higher
order preferences of experimental subjects (a few prominent examples within the framework of risk
include Deck and Schlesinger 2010, 2014, Maier and Rüger, 2012, Noussair et al. 2014, Ebert and
Wiesen, 2011, 2014; and Heinrich and Mayrhofer, 2018, and within the framework of ambiguity
Baillon et al. 2018).
In this paper, we will focus on the rst two higher order preferences, namely, risk apportionment
of order 3 and 4, also known as prudence and temperance, respectively.1
A key feature of the experimental research reported to date on higher order lottery choices is
that researchers have endeavoured to implement their appropriate reference point by experimental
procedure and lottery design. This reference point is then assumed in analysis of the responses of the
experimental subjects.2 Maier and Rüger (2012), Bleichrodt and van Bruggen (2018) and Brunette
and Jacob (2019) report results where the status quo reference point is assumed. Alternatively,
Deck and Schlesinger (2010) and Ebert and Wiesen (2014) assumed that the reference point was
the average payo¤.
Recent research by Baillon et al. (2019) developed a test for the appropriate reference point
employing second order lottery choices and assuming CPT preferences. Two of the reference points
1Prudence was coined by Kimball (1990) in his analysis of precautionary savings within and expected-utility
framework. Temperance, on the other hand, was rst employed by Kimball (1992) in his work on precautionary
motives for holding assets.
2For example, the experimental design in Maier and Rüger (2012) was set up to try to ensure that the status quo
was the reference point. They write: We carefully designed our experiment to implement the status quo prior to the
second date as the reference point.
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they considered, the status quo and the MaxMin (the maximum outcome subjects can obtain for
sure), were identied as the most frequently employed each by around 30% of their experimental
subjects.3 ;4 In this paper, we will examine third and fourth order lottery choices as employing these
two reference points as well as the average or expected return of the lotteries since, as noted above,
the expected payout has been employed in prominent studies on higher order preferences.
Deck and Schlesinger (2010 p.1414, 2012 pp.28-29) conjecture that any higher order lottery
choices are in principle consistent with CPT due to the interplay of cumulative weighting of prob-
abilities, the value functions properties over gains and losses, and loss aversion. We examine this
conjecture employing a framework based on the method of Yaari (1987) in conjunction with a de-
nition of the representative experimental CPT subject. From the status quo reference point the
representative CPT subject is assumed to exhibit solely the form of probability weighting whereby
small probabilities are over-weighted and larger ones are under-weighted. From the expected payout
or MaxMin reference point, we assume the parametric model of CPT and the range of parameter
values reported in the prominent research of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Deck and Schlesinger
(2010), Ebert and Wiesen (2014) and Baillon et al. (2019).
The results of our analysis reveal that from the status quo reference point we can derive the
general result that CPT individual will always makes prudent and temperate lottery choices when
all payo¤s are positive, and prudent and intemperate lottery choices when all lottery payo¤s are
negative. For mixed lotteries, when the status quo is the reference point, all third and fourth order
lottery choices are feasible.
From the expected value reference point, our anaysis reveals that the representative CPT subject
exhibits prudent or imprudent, temperate or intemperate lottery choices depending on the precise
lottery payo¤s employed and their risky choice parameter values. From the MaxMin reference
3K½oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) (KR) assume the reference point is expectations-based, taken to be the entire
distribution of expected outcomes. In choosing between two lotteries, the expected utility of each lottery is evaluated
by determining the expected utilities of the di¤erence between each possible outcome and the reference point outcome.
Following the method of Baillon et al. (2019), who illustrated the implications of the KR assumption for the expected
utility of a second order lottery, we can show that the KR hypothesis implies the individual is indi¤erent between
the prudent and imprudent lotteries. This is demonstrated in the Appendix.
4We are not aware of any study on higher-order preferences that has assumed the MaxMin reference point. We
also note that Baillon et al. (2019) found little support for expected payout as the reference point.
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point, the representative CPT subject always makes a prudent or temperate lottery choice.
These ndings have a number of implications for experimental research. Whilst most experimen-
tal studies report that the majority third order lottery choice is prudent. However, the experimental
evidence does not support a majority fourth order preference. For example, Deck and Schlesinger
(2010) reported more intemperate choices than temperate, which contrasted with the reverse nd-
ing of Noussair et al. (2014) and Ebert and Wiesen (2014). Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2018)
in their review report the ranges of the average proportion of risk averse, prudent and temperate
choices observed in experimental research which span the proportions [46,84], [45,96], and [38,87],
respectively.5 Overall, the experimental results reveal that there is a non-negligible proportion
of imprudent and intemperate lottery choices which are inconsistent with everywhere-concave ex-
pected utility theory (EUT) models. We will provide an explanation of how these experimental
ndings on higher order risk preferences can be reconciled with cumulative prospect theory (CPT)
of Tversky and Kahneman.
The implications of our analysis of third and fourth order lottery choices from the status quo
reference point is particularly interesting given the lottery choices reported by Maier and Rüger
(2012), Bleichrodt and van Bruggen (2018) and Brunette and Jacob (2019) who all assumed the
status quo reference point. Maier and Rüger reported that the average proportion of prudent
choices when all lottery payo¤s were positive was, for ten lottery choices, 60% with a maximum
of 70% and a minimum of 49%. The corresponding gures when all lottery payo¤s were losses
was, for seven lottery choices, 55%, 63% and 49%, respectively. The proportions of temperate
or intemperate choices reported by Maier and Rüger also show wide variations. For the all-gains
lotteries the average proportion of temperate choices reported was, for ten lottery choices, 58%
with a maximum of 73% and minimum of 43%. The corresponding gures for the seven all-losses
lotteries were 54%, 69%, and 40%, respectively.
Bleichrodt and van Bruggen (2018) report that, for twelve all-gain lotteries, the average propor-
tion of prudent choices was 56% and, for twelve all-gain lotteries, the average temperate response
was 40.4%. The corresponding gures for twelve of each all-losses lotteries were an average of
5Those gures are based on table A.1 in Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2018). The gures in the text correspond
to averages in the studies reported in Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2018), but if the range within each of those
studies were to be employed instead, the overall range of values would be signicantly wider.
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39.8% prudent and 69.6% intemperate. Brunette and Jacob (2019) report, for ve lottery choices,
an average of 2.63 prudent choices in the all-gain domain, and 1.29 in the all-loss domain. The
corresponding gures for the ve temperate/intemperate choices were 3.42 temperate for all gains
and 2.87 for all losses.
Clearly, the results reported in these three experimental studies suggest that there is a signicant
proportion of lottery choices that are not consistent with the choices that would be made by the
representative CPT or EUT subject from the status quo reference point.
Our new result that from the average reference point the CPT representative subjects can
exhibit any third or fourth order preference, enables us to help explain the experimental ndings
reported by Deck and Schlesinger (2010) and Ebert and Wiesen (2014). In these two studies the
average reference point was assumed. Whilst both studies reported a majority third order preference
of prudence, they di¤ered in the majority fourth order preference. The parameter values of the
representative CPT subject reported in Deck and Schlesinger imply an intemperate majority choice
employing their lottery payo¤s and would also imply an intemperate majority choice employing the
lottery payo¤s employed in Ebert and Wiesen (2014). Conversely, the parameter values of the
representative subject reported in Ebert and Wiesen imply a majority temperate choice employing
their lottery payo¤s and would also imply a majority temperate choice employing the lottery payo¤s
employed in Deck and Schlesinger. Both sets of parameters reported in these two studies imply
majority prudent choices for the lottery payo¤s employed.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we set out the method of elicitation
of third and fourth order preferences as well as the parametric model of CPT employed in our
analysis. Sections 3, 4, and 5 present the predictions of CPT for risk apportionment of order
3 and 4 assuming the three di¤erent reference points: status quo, average payo¤, and MaxMin,
respectively, and employing a variety of lottery payo¤ structures. The nal section provides the
conclusions.
2 The CPT model and elicitation of higher order preferences
Our analysis of higher order preferences follows the methodology developed by Deck and Schlesinger
(2014). Deck and Schlesingers method derives from Eeckhoudt et al. (2009) and generalises the
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approach of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006). The elicitation of higher order preferences is done
through the choices of 50-50 lottery pairs. We will write [z_y] to denote a lottery of equally
likely payo¤s z and y: Let us denote an individuals endowment W > 0; reductions in wealth
k1 > 0; k2 > 0; and zero-mean random variables e"1  [ "1_"1];e"2  [ "2_"2]; whose distributions
are assumed to be statistically independent of one another, and "1; "2 > 0. The 50-50 lottery
An  [W_W + z+ y] has more nth-degree risk (n = 2; 3 or 4) than lottery Bn  [W + z_W + y]:6
We will only examine risk attitudes up to order four, so z will take the values of either  k1 or e"1;
and y will be either  k2 or e"2. In the terminology of Deck and Schlesinger (2014), individuals are
labelled as risk apportionate of order nif they dislike the lottery with more nth-degree risk, i.e.,
Bn  An. Table 1 presents the classication of risk attitudes and their corresponding lottery pair
structure.
Table 1. Risk attitudes and lottery pair structure (Bn; An)
Risk preference Bn An
n = 2; Risk aversion
z =  k1; y =  k2 B2  [W   k1_W   k2] A2  [W_W   k1   k2]
n = 3; Prudence
z = e"1; y =  k2 B3  [W + e"1_W   k2] A3  [W_W   k2 + e"1]
n = 4; Temperance
z = e"1; y = e"2 B4  [W + e"1_W + e"2] A4  [W_W + e"1 + e"2]
An individual who is prudent has a preference to combine the relatively goodoutcome (en-
dowment W without the loss of k2) with the badoutcome (zero-mean risk e"1), as in lottery B3,
instead of combining the two relatively badoutcomes together (wealth reduction of k2 and the
zero-mean risk e"1), as it is the case in lottery A3. Likewise, an individual is temperate if she prefers
to combine the relatively good and bad outcomes (B4) instead of combining the two bad
outcomes together (zero-mean risks e"1 and e"2) as it is the case in A4.
In our analysis, we will initially assume linear value functions. Assuming linearity of the value
functions implies that the representation of di¤erent risk preferences is done exclusively through
6Using Deck and Schlesingers (2014) notation, the lottery structure to elicit temperance could also be constructed
with a combination of n = 1;m = 3 (see Deck and Schlesinger, 2014 p.1919). To simplify notation and the analysis
below, we only consider the case of n = 2;m = 2:
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subjective cumulative probability weighting transformations (e.g. Yaari (1987), in his dual theory)
from the status quo reference point (except for mixed lotteries) and through subjective cumulative
probability weighting and loss aversion from the average or MaxMin reference points.7 In the case
of the status quo reference point, when all lottery payo¤s are either gains or losses, this enables us
to determine the higher order lottery choices since all that is necessary to determine the preference,
given the probability weighting, is the assumption of value functions that are everywhere risk-
averse over gains and risk-seeking over losses. However, when we relax the assumption of linear
value functions, we can only determine the third or fourth order lottery choice from the average
or MaxMin reference points by assuming a particular form of the value functions since the degree
of risk-aversion or risk-seeking plays a role in the higher order choice. We therefore employ the
parametric models of CPT reported in four prominent studies. We assume the representative agent
is dened by the most common parameterization of CPT that includes power value functions, v(:);
with reference point r, parameter  2 [0; 1]; and a loss aversion parameter ; in conjunction with
an inverse-S-shaped weighting function, w(p).8
v(x) =
8<: (x  r)
 for x > r











where w+(p) and w (p) are the probability weighting functions for gains and losses, respec-
tively.9 In CPT, the probability weighting function does not apply to the probability density
7Also in experimental research on second order risk preferences over small lottery payo¤s numerous researchers
report that linear value functions are a good approximation to the value function (e.g. Fehr-duda et al., 2006;
Abdellaoui et al., 2008; Ring et al., 2018; and LHaridon and Vieider, 2019). It is also of interest to note that, in the
only paper that has estimated a CPT model for higher order preferences, Ebert and Wiesen (2014) report a value of
the power exponent as 0:97; presumably not statistically di¤erent from unity.
8The value function v(x) can be generalised if parameter  di¤ers over gains and over losses. We keep this simpler
form for the following reasons: (i) it provides a more intuitive understanding of the role played by the degree of
risk seeking/risk aversion in the determination of higher order preferences; (ii) many of the prominent studies listed
below assume equal power coe¢ cient over gains and losses; and (iii) generalising the results would be relatively
straightforward.
9Our results will apply in general to any probability weighting function that overweights small probabilities and
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function but to the cumulative probability distribution. For gains, x > r, the cumulative weighting
is applied from the largest to smallest gain, or in the case of losses, from the largest loss to the
smallest.
Table 2 lists the four model specications from Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Deck and
Schlesinger (2010), Ebert and Wiesen (2014), and Baillon et al. (2019), which we will refer to from
here onwards as TK, DS, EW, and BBS, respectively.10 The parameters of DS and EW are based
on studies on third and fourth order preferences and that of TK and BBS on second order.
Table 2. Four Parameterisations of the CPT Model
   
Tversky and Kahnemann (1992) (TK) 0:88 2:25 0:61 0:69
Deck and Schlesinger (2010) (DS) 0:88 2:25 0:65 0:65
Ebert and Wiesen (2014) (EW) 0:97 1:53 0:43 0:43
Baillon, Bleichrodt and Spinu (2019) (BBS) 0:48 2:34 0:53 0:53
We employ the range of parameter values to derive the implications for third and fourth order
lottery preferences from the three di¤erent reference points. We nd that the third and fourth
order lottery choices of the representative CPT individual will depend on the precise parameter
values and lottery payo¤ structure. This enables us to explain the conicting experimental results
reported.
The next three sections present analytical expressions that dene risk apportionment of order
3 and 4. Each section corresponds to a di¤erent assumption about the appropriate reference point.
underweights large probabilities. We have decided to illustrate our framework with the function in Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) since it is employed in three of the most prominent studies that report parameter values.
10Baillon et al. (2019) report a one parameter Prelec weighting function w(p) = e (  ln p)
0:43
with the same
parameter over gains and losses. When  =  = 0:53 the weighting function described in this section is employed to
proxy the Prelec function since it makes no important di¤erence to our reported results in our setting.
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3 Reference point 1: Status Quo
3.1 Prudence
3.1.1 Domain of gains: Lottery payo¤s are all gains
From the status quo reference point the probabilities and payo¤s of the prudent, B3, and imprudent,
A3; lottery pair are given by11
B3 : 0:5; (W   k2) ; 0:25; (W + "1) ; 0:25; (W   "1)
A3 : 0:5; (W ) ; 0:25; (W   k2 + "1) ; 0:25; (W   k2   "1) :
The cumulative weighting of probabilities in CPT implies there are two cases depending on the
relative magnitudes of k2 and "1: The rst case we consider is k2 > "1: Given this lottery payo¤
structure, the value of the prospects, V (B3) and V (A3); are given by the following expressions
V (B3) = w
+(0:25)(W + "1) +
 
w+(0:5)  w+(0:25) (W   "1) +  1  w+(0:5) (W   k2)
V (A3) = w
+(0:5)(W ) +
 
w+(0:75)  w+(0:5) (W + "1   k2) +  1  w+(0:75) (W   "1   k2):
Risk apportionment of order 3 requires V (B3) > V (A3); and this condition is met if
 




1 + 2w+ (0:25) > 2w+ (0:75)
0:5 + w+(0:25) > w+(0:75): (1)
Expression (1) can also be written in terms of probability distortion as ew+(0:25) > ew+(0:75);
where ew+(p) = w+(p) p: This condition holds for the representative CPT subject who overweights
probabilities of 0:25 ( ew+(0:25) > 0) and underweights probabilities of 0:75 ( ew+(0:75) < 0). The
probability weighting assumed for the representative CPT experimental subject therefore implies
that, with linear value function, the prudent lottery, B3; will always be chosen.
11A lottery L with payo¤s x and y and corresponding probabilities px and py is represented by L : px; x; py; y:
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Introducing risk aversion over gains in the absence of probability distortion also implies a
prudent choice. Consequently, in this case, the CPT individual will always exhibit prudence which
is not dependent upon a power value function. 12
The order of the lottery payo¤ structure is changed for the second case, when k2 < "1: Never-
theless, the condition for the agent to exhibit prudence when  = 1 is also (1), and the conclusions
are therefore the same.
3.1.2 Domain of Losses: Lottery payo¤s are all negative
In this case, the weighting of cumulative probability of payo¤s is from largest loss to smallest loss.
Since the subjective expected value of the lottery is negative, we will ignore the negative sign. For
the payo¤ structure when k2 > "1; we obtain, assuming a power value function, the value of the
prospects is given by13
V (B3) = w
 (0:5) (W + k2) +
 
w (0:75)  w (0:5) (W + "1) +  1  w (0:75) (W   "1)
V (A3) = w
 (0:25) (W + k2 + "1) +
 
w (0:5)  w (0:25) (W + k2   "1) +  1  w (0:5) (W ) :
Since we are dealing with losses, a prudent choice requires the absolute value of V (B3) to be
less than the absolute value of V (A3).14 The condition for risk apportionment of order 3 with linear
12 In Rank Dependent Utility (RDU) of Quiggin (1982), the ranking of cumulative weighting of probabilities is not
the same as in CPT since the weighting is from worst to best outcome. The weighting is therefore di¤erent to CPT
over gains but the same over losses (see Quiggin (1993, p.57) or Neilson (2001, p3)). Nevertheless, over all-gains and
over all-losses the results are the same as in CPT, namely, the agent behaves always as prudent.
13The loss aversion parameter  drops out from the expression because it multiplies both V (B3) and V (A3):
14To clarify the argument about lottery pair choices in the all-losses case, we provide the following numerical
example. Let us consider a linear value function and assume that W =  8; k2 =  5; e"1  [3_   3]; employing
negative values we obtain
V (B3) = w
 (0:5)( 13) +  w (0:75)  w (0:5) ( 11) +  1  w (0:75) ( 5)
= w (0:5)( 2) + w (0:75)( 6)  5
V (A3) = w
 (0:25)( 16) +  w (0:5)  w (0:25) ( 10) +  1  w (0:5) ( 8)
= w (0:25)( 6) + w (0:5)( 2)  8;






value functions, when  = 1; is obtained as 2w (0:75) < 1+2w (0:25): This is the same condition
for prudence in the domain of gains, expression (1). Consequently, the cumulative weighting of
probabilities implies that a CPT individual with a linear value function would make the prudent
lottery choice.
When we introduce risk-seeking value preferences the third derivative of the value function
is negative which enhances the imprudent lottery over the prudent lottery but the negative sign
implies that the prudent lottery exhibits less negative expected value and is preferred.We illustrate
this point in Figure 1 employing the parameterisations of DS and EW described in the previous
section. We observe that across all values of  (0 <   1)15 the absolute value of V (B3) is below
that of V (A3) and that they only intersect at  = 0: The same implications follow for lottery pairs
where k2 < "1.

















Figure 1. Plots of absolute values of V (B3) -solid line- and V (A3) -dash line- for paramaterisatons
DS (left) and EW (right) for lottery payo¤s W =  3; k2 =  6; "1 = 2
3.1.3 Mixed Domain
In the case where lottery payo¤s involve both gains and losses, we nd that the representative
CPT subject can exhibit prudent or imprudent lottery choices. There are many possible lottery
structures in this case dependent on the precise values of the payo¤s. We illustrate with a lottery
payo¤ sturucture reported in the experimental literature where W = 0 and k2 > "1: In this case,
the values of the prospects are the following
15 .Note that  < 1 is a necessary condition for risk seeking over losses with a power value function. A smaller 
implies a higher degree of risk seeking
12
V (B3) = w
+(0:25)("1)
   w (0:5)(k2)   
 
w (0:75)  w (0:5) ("1)
V (A3) =  w (0:25) ("1 + k2)   
 
w (0:5)  w (0:25) (k2   "1) :
With linear value functions, the condition for the prudent choice (B3  A3) is w+(0:25) +
2w (0:25) > w+(0:75); and when  = 0, the condition is w+(0:25) > (w+(0:75)   w+(0:5)):
The second condition is violated for representative values of probability distortion and loss aversion.
Consequently, our representative CPT subject exhibits a switch point from prudent to imprudent.
To illustrate, we employ as an example the lottery payo¤s W = 0; k2 = 6; "1 = 4 employed in
experimental work by Maier and Rüger (2012). Assuming the parameter values for loss aversion
and probability weighting in KT, Figure 2 illustrates that the individual is prudent only if the risk
aversion parameter is higher than a specic value, in particular  > 0:643:










Figure 2. Plots of V (B3) -solid line- and V (A3) -dash line- for parameterisation
TK and lottery payo¤s W = 0; k2 = 6; "1 = 4
3.2 Temperance
3.2.1 Domain of Gains
To analyse risk apportionment of order 4, or temperance, we proceed as in the previous subsection
and rst consider the case where all payo¤s are in the gains domain, that is,W > "2+"1. Assuming
that the payo¤s of the two independent risks are di¤erent16, "2 > "1; the probabilities and outcomes
of the two lotteries are the following
16When "2 = "1; the conclusions of our analysis are not changed but the mathematics is, and they are available
upon request.
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B4 : 0:25; (W + "2) ; 0:25; (W + "1) ; 0:25; (W   "1) ; 0:25; (W   "2)
A4 : 0:5; (W ) ; 0:125; (W + "2 + "1) ; 0:125; (W + "2   "1) ; 0:125; (W   "2 + "1) ; 0:125; (W   "2   "1) :
Employing the cumulative probability weighting process from highest to lowest gain, the value
of the prospects assuming power value functions are given by
V (B4) = w
+(0:25) (W + "2)
 +
 
w+(0:5)  w+(0:25) (W + "1) +  w+(0:75)  w+(0:5) (W   "1)
+
 
1  w+(0:75) (W   "2)
V (A4) = w
+(0:125) (W + "2 + "1)
 +
 
w+(0:25)  w+(0:125) (W + "2   "1) +  w+(0:75)  w+(0:25) (W )
+
 
w+(0:875)  w+(0:75) (W   "2 + "1) +  1  w+(0:875) (W   "2   "1) :
In the case of a linear value function,  = 1; the condition for the temperate lottery choice,
V (B4) > V (A4), is given by
1 + 2w+(0:5) > 2w+(0:125) + 2w+(0:875)
0:5 + w+(0:5) > w+(0:125) + w+(0:875):
This condition can also be written in terms of probability distortion as ew+(0:5) > ew+(0:125) +
ew+(0:875). For the standard probability weighting functions that overweight small probabilities,
this condition holds. Since all lottery payo¤s are gains, introducing risk aversion into the value
functions reinforces the e¤ect of the probability weighting so that the representative CPT subject
always makes the temperate lottery choice when the status quo is the reference point.
3.2.2 Domain of Losses
When the lottery payo¤s are all negative and "2 > "1; the value of temperate and intemperate
lotteries are given by
14
V (B4) = w
 (0:25) (W + "2) +
 
w (0:5)  w (0:25) (W + "1) +  w (0:75)  w (0:5) (W   "1)
+
 
1  w (0:75) (W   "2)
V (A4) = w
 (0:125) (W + "2 + "1) +
 
w (0:25)  w (0:125) (W + "2   "1) +  w (0:75)  w (0:25) (W )
+
 
w (0:875)  w (0:75) (W   "2 + "1) +  1  w (0:875) (W   "2   "1) :
Since the weighting order of probabilities is the same in the domain of gains and losses, the
condition for choice of the intemperate lottery over losses when the value functions are linear
is the smallest absolute value of the prospects. Consequently, with linear value functions the
representative CPT individual exhibits intemperance. Introducing risk-seeking,  < 1; favours the
intemperate lottery. The representative CPT individual therefore always makes the intemperate
lottery choice. Consequently, there is a reection e¤ect in fourth order preferences when the status
quo is the reference point.
3.2.3 Mixed domain
For lottery payo¤s that involve both gains and losses there are a number of di¤erent lottery payo¤
structures dependent on whether "2+ "1 > W or "1 > W: We found, after analysing these di¤erent
lottery structures, that the representative CPT subject individual can make either temperate or
intemperate lottery choices.
We also note that if W = 0 the formal analysis from the status quo reference point is the same
as from the expected reference point, and therefore to save space, we present the analysis of that
particular case when we assume the average payo¤ is the reference point.
4 Reference Point 2: Average payo¤
Deck and Schlesinger (2010) and Ebert and Wiesen (2014) analyse higher order preferences within
a CPT framework assuming the reference point is the expected payo¤ from the lottery so that
the reference points for the order 3 and 4 are respectively W   0:5k2 and W: This implies that
the lotteries now exhibit both gains and losses and therefore fall within the mixed domain. It
also implies that the endowment, W , plays no role in determining higher order preferences. We
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demonstrate that from the average payo¤ reference point the representative CPT subject, dened
by the range of parameters in Table 2, can make prudent or imprudent, temperate or intemperate
choices dependent upon the precise lottery payo¤s. As a consequence, our representative CPT
individuals can exhibit some, perhaps surprising, combinations of second and third or fourth order
preferences.
If we determine the certainty equivalent of the chosen third or fourth order lottery choice we
must employ the lottery prior to transformation to the average reference point. We nd that
the certainty equivalents of the untransformed lottery can be lower or higher than the expected
value dependent upon the value of the endowment (W ). Consequently, the representative CPT
subject can exhibit, for example, an imprudent third order preference or an intemperate fourth
order preference but be risk averse based on the certainty equivalent of the untransformed lotteries.
This also implies that the correlation between second order lottery choices and higher order lottery
choices will be lottery specic if the reference point is the average payo¤.
Another implication of the analysis is that a researcher can examine, ex-ante, the higher order
lottery choices for di¤erent lottery payo¤ structures employing a range of representative parameters
and determine which payo¤ structure is the most appropriate for eliciting imprudent or intemperate
lottery choices and therefore more likely to reject alternative models such as EUT.
4.1 Temperance
We rst consider risk apportionment of order 4 since, as noted above, some prominent studies report
that temperate choices are the majority (Noussair et al., 2014; and Ebert and Wiesen, 2014) whilst
others the intemperate choice (Deck and Schlesinger, 2010). The lottery pair to elicit temperance
are the following, "2 > "1
B4 : 0:25; ("2); 0:25; ("1); 0:25; ( "2); 0:25; ( "1)
A4 : 0:125; ("2 + "1); 0:125; ("2   "1) ; 0:125; ( "2 + "1) ; 0:125; ( "2   "1) :
The value of the prospects for our representative CPT subjects are given by
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w+(0:5)  w+(0:25) ("1)   w (0:25)("2)     w (0:5)  w (0:25) ("1)
V (A4) = w
+(0:125) ("2 + "1)
 +
 
w+(0:25)  w+(0:125) ("2   "1)   w (0:125) ("2 + "1)
   w (0:25)  w (0:125) ("2   "1) :
If we consider the choice of lottery when the individual has linear value functions so that  = 1;




> 2w+(0:125) + w (0:5):
In this case, we nd that the probability weighting and loss aversion parameters play a crucial
role in determining the fourth order lottery choice when the value functions are linear. For EW and
BB we nd their representative subjects will make the temperate choice, whilst the representative
subjects of TK and DS would make an intemperate choice. When we set  = 0; which is as if
assuming innitely risk aversion over gains and risk seeking over losses, risk apportionment of order
4 holds if
w+(0:5) + w (0:25) > w+(0:25) + w (0:5):
In this case, we nd with the representative set of parameters there are no switches in prefer-
ences. Consequently, the precise values of the probability distortion and loss aversion coe¢ cient play
a crucial role in determining whether, from the average reference point, a temperate or intemperate
lottery choice will be made.
Figure 3 illustrates the e¤ect that di¤erent parameter combinations have in the agents decision.
We employ lottery payo¤s "1 = 3:5; "2 = 7 (as in Ebert and Wiesen 2014), and parameter values
from the four CPT specications outlined in Table 2. In two of the cases, TK and DS, the lines for
V (B4) and V (A4) never cross each other, implying the agent would always exhibit intemperance.
In the other two cases, EW and BBS, the two lines cross each other, meaning the power exponent
will determine whether the individual makes the temperate or intemperate lottery choice. For
example, for the values of  reported in their papers, 0:97 in EW and 0:48 in BBS, the agent would
choose the temperate and the intemperate lottery choice, respectively. The overall conclusion from
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this analysis is that the representative CPT individual can make temperate or intemperate lottery
choices.









































Figure 3 depicts V (B4) -solid lines- and V (A4) -dashed lines- for lottery structure "1 = 3:5; "2 = 7 and
parameter values employed in TK -top left-, DS -top right-, EW -bottom left- and BBS -bottom right-.
To illustrate that the representative individual can exhibit surprising combinations of second
and higher order preferences, let consider the lottery payo¤s W = 55; "1 = 5; "2 = 45: Employing
the parameters from TK described in Table 2 we nd that V (A4) > V (B4); and therefore the
agent makes the intemperate choice. The certainty equivalent of the untransformed intemperate
lottery choice is 45:93; which is less than 55 (the average payo¤), hence the agent is risk averse,
and intemperate.
4.2 Prudence
From a reference point of expected return the implied prudent or imprudent lottery choice is given
by
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B3 : 0:5; ( 0:5k2) ; 0:25; ("1 + 0:5k2) ; 0:25; ( "1 + 0:5k2)
A3 : 0:5; (0:5k2); 0:25; ("1   0:5k2); 0:25; ( "1   0:5k2):
The relative size of k2 and "1 now determines three possible cases in terms of valuation of the
prospects. The rst one is when "1  k2 > 0:5k2: The subjective expected values are the following
V (B3) = w
+(0:25) ("1 + 0:5k2)
   w (0:25) ("1   0:5k2)   
 
w (0:75)  w (0:25) (0:5k2)
V (A3) = w
+(0:25) ("1   0:5k2) +
 
w+(0:75)  w+(0:25) (0:5k2)   w (0:25) ("1 + 0:5k2) :
If we consider the choice of lottery when the individual has linear value functions so that  = 1;





> w+(0:75) + w (0:75):
It is easy to see that this condition holds for all representative CPT parameter values because
small probabilities are overweighted while large probabilities are underweighted. Conversely, if we
set  = 0 which is as if assuming innitely risk aversion over gains and risk seeking over losses, risk
apportionment of order 3 holds if
w+(0:25) + w (0:25) > w+(0:75) + w (0:75):
In this case the imprudent choice will be made by the representative CPT subject. Since the
representative CPT subject makes the prudent lottery choice with linear value functions but the
imprudent choice if su¢ ciently risk averse over gains or risk seeking over losses with the represen-
tative values of loss aversion, this implies that there can be prudent or imprudent lottery choices
dependent upon these parameters in experimental research. For instance, in the case of lottery pay-
o¤s "1 = 9; k2 = 1; in three out of the four CPT parameterisations in Table 2, namely TK, EW, and
DS, the individual would exhibit the prudent lottery choice, whilst in the fourth parameterisation,
BBS, the CPT representative agent would be exhibit the imprudent lottery choice.
The following example illustrates how payo¤ magnitudes can impact on the cross over point
that determines di¤erent risk attitudes of order 3 employing parameter values reported by TK and
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BBS. Let us consider two lottery pair designs, one with "1 = 9; k2 = 1; and another one with
"1 = 25; k2 = 25: Figure 4 plots the value of the prospects in each of those two cases. We observe
that the level of risk aversion at which agents switch from imprudent to prudent behaviour di¤ers
between the two parameterisations and lottery payo¤ structure.










































Figure 4 plots V (B3) -solid line- and V (A3) -dashed line- for lottery designs "1 = 9; k2 = 1 -top-;
and "1 = 25; k2 = 25 -bottom-, and parameters in TK -left- and BBS -right-.
We now demonstrate that the representative CPT individual can make the imprudent lottery
choice when exhibiting either risk averse or risk loving second order preferences. We employ one
of the examples above where the lottery choice is the imprudent one (V (A3) > V (B3)). We then
compute the certainty equivalent of this lottery choice employing the untransformed lottery A3,
which is the relevant lottery for computing the certainty equivalent of the imprudent lottery choice,
V (A3). With lottery payo¤s "1 = 9; k2 = 1; and the EW values of loss aversion and probability
distortion, but with a power exponent  = 0:6; the imprudent lottery choice, V (A3); has a certainty
equivalent based on lottery A3 when W = 10 of 3:48; a value which is less than the expected value
of 9:5: Consequently, a risk-averse CPT subject can make an imprudent lottery choice but be
risk averse. However, if the endowment is increased to W = 100, the certainty equivalent of the
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untransformed lottery A3 is 103:6; and the CPT individual therefore makes an imprudent choice
but is risk-seeking.
This analysis demonstrates how imprudent third order lottery choices from the average reference
point, which can exceed thirty percent (see Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2018), may exhibit a
low correlation with second order preferences obtained directly from second order lottery choices.
The relevant correlation is between the imprudent choices and the certainty equivalent of the
untransformed imprudent lottery choice.
Finally, we examine the other two cases that arise from di¤erent payo¤ structure in the lottery
design for prudence. In the case where 0:5k2 > "1; the subjective expected values are the following
V (B3) = w
+(0:25) ("1 + 0:5k2)
 +
 
w+(0:5)  w+(0:25) (0:5k2   "1)   w (0:5) (0:5k2)
V (A3) = w
+(0:5) (0:5k2)
   w (0:25) ("1 + 0:5k2)   
 
w (0:5)  w (0:25) (0:5k2   "1) :
In this case we nd that the representative subject can be prudent or imprudent. The same
implication applies to the third case where k2 > "1 but "1  0:5k2:17 Overall, the analysis of this
section reveals the way in which model parameters and lottery payo¤ structures can imply di¤erent
higher order lottery choices for the representative CPT subject.
5 Reference Point 3: MaxMin
Baillon et al. (2019) report that the MaxMin criterion, dened as the maximum outcome that a
subject can reach for sure, is, together with the status quo, the most common reference point used
in decision under risk. The results in their study of second order risky choices show that MaxMin
is employed by 30% of experimental subjects as the reference point.
Employing our framework we nd, from the MaxMin reference point, the representative CPT
with power value functions and the range of loss aversion reported in the representative studies
subject will always choose the prudent and the temperate lotteries.18 Consequently, the representa-
17 In this case the associated prospect values are given by
V (B3) = w
+(0:25) ("1 + 0:5k2)
   w (0:5) (0:5k2)   
 
w (0:75)  w (0:5) ("1   0:5k2)




w+(0:75)  w+(0:5) ("1   0:5k2)   w (0:25) ("1 + 0:5k2) :
18 In this section, we have omitted the formal derivations to preserve some space, but they are all available upon
request.
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tive CPT subject from the MaxMin reference point makes the same third and fourth order lottery
choices as is the case from the status quo reference point when all lottery payo¤s are gains.19
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the third and fourth order lottery choices of representative
agents in CPT from three reference points. An important nding is that a CPT subject will, in
common with an EUT subject, always make prudent or temperate lottery choices from the status
quo reference point when all lottery payo¤s are gains and prudent or intemperate lottery choices
when all lottery payo¤s are losses. As a consequence, there is no reection e¤ect for third order
lottery choices but there is for fourth order lottery choices from the status quo reference point.
From the average payout reference point, we demonstrated that, dependent upon the precise
magnitude of lottery payo¤s, all third and fourth order lottery choices can be made by the repre-
sentative CPT subjects who exhibit the range of parameter values for probability weighting, power
value functions and loss aversion reported in prominent studies. Our analysis also revealed that
from the average payout reference point there are combinations of second and third or fourth order
preferences that have not previously been associated with the representative CPT agent. We also
showed that the correlation between second and higher order lottery choices will be lottery specic
if the reference point is the average payo¤.
Our results have further implications for experimental research that ts parametric models
to explain higher order lottery preferences. For instance, our ndings shed light on whether the
design of an experiment would be informative enough to discriminate between CPT and alternative
risky-choice models.
19We note that it is possible to nd cases where a CPT individual makes the intemperate choice. For instance with
 = 0:93, and parameters  = 1:3;  =  < 0:52, and lottery design "2 = 9; "1 = 1: However, we do not consider this
parameterisation as a representative CPT agent because the minimum loss aversion parameter  considered in Table
2 is 1:53:
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Appendix. K½oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) reference point
In the Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) approach the reference point is dependent upon the entire
distribution of expected outcomes in each lottery. Following Baillon et al. (2019) and equating nal
wealth with outcome, the expected utility of the di¤erence in lottery payo¤s from each reference
point are evaluated.
U(B3) = 0:5 [0:5U(0) + 0:25U(k2 + "1) + 0:25U(k2   "1)] + 0:25 [0:5U( k2   "1) + 0:25U(0) + 0:25U( 2"1)]
+0:25 [0:5U("1   k2) + 0:25U(2"1) + 0:25U(0)]
= 0:5 [0:25U(k2 + "1) + 0:25U(k2   "1)] + 0:25 [0:5U( k2   "1)  0:5U("1)]
+0:25 [0:5U("1   k2) + 0:5U("1)]
U(A3) = 0:5 [0:5U(0) + 0:25U("1   k2) + 0:25U( "1   k2)] + 0:25 [0:5U(k2   "1) + 0:25U(0) + 0:25U( 2"1)]
+0:25 [0:5U(k2 + "1) + 0:25U(2"1) + 0:25U(0)]
= 0:5 [0:25U("1   k2) + 0:25U( "1   k2)] + 0:25 [0:5U(k2   "1)  0:5U("1)]
+0:25 [0:5U(k2 + "1) + 0:5U("1)] ;
which implies U(B3) = U(A3) and the individual is indi¤erent between the prudent and impru-
dent lotteries.
Regarding risk apportionment of order 4, our analysis available upon request shows that the
K½oszegi and Rabin approach implies the representative subject will exhibit temperance.
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